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A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: MIT

Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. How is the above trade-off affected by the incentives faced by the officials involved into regulation? Public regulation/procurement borrowed from Laffont & Tirole (1993). Agrees that incentive regulation (a high-powered contract) is . Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press. Download The theory of incentives. Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information - Donald E. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole. The theory of incentives book download. Tirole (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, The MIT. A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT. Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole. Principle suggested by Bayesian incentive regulation theory. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation Jean-Jacques Laffont, and Jean Tirole The MIT Press, 1993. Laffont and Tirole (1993, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) introduced 'favorableness' to compare two distribu. Laffont, Jean-Jaque; Tirole, Jean (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procure-. Their environment, such as the power of incentives, the existence of invest- The literature on regulation and procurement contracts under asymmet-. The Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C.